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ABSTRACT
Title of Research Paper:

The Strategy of MBMs to Tackle GHG Emissions
For International Shipping in China

Degree:

Msc

The research endeavors to tackle GHG emissions from international shipping
industry by adopting MBMs developed by IMO. Comparing emission change
scheme

with

the

marine

emission

trade

scheme,

this

research

offers

recommendations to Chinese maritime authority on how to get better prepared for
the upcoming MBMs to curb GHG emission from international shipping industry. In
spite of many proposals on the IMO’s table, analyses made in this paper are mainly
focused on the emission charge and marine emission trade scheme, including the role
of IMO, potential market distortion, carbon leakage and etc.

Based on the scenarios developed by IPCC and other international standards, the
quantitative analysis method is adopted to calculate the CO2 emission from Chinese
international fleet. The data obtained present a very challenging result. In
implementing MBMs by IMO, which could be well expected in the near future,
several proposals on data collection, instrument selection and fund establishment
were discussed.

KEYWORDS: MBMs, GHG emissions, Emission charge, METS, Statistics.
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Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 Background
Global climate change has posed a great threat to our ecological system and
economic society. One of the main reasons or perhaps the most notable one lies in
the anthropogenic GHG emissions. The international community, under the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), has realized the
seriousness of the problem and urged countries to control the temperature increase
by 2℃ based on the pre-industrial level in the Copenhagen Accord in 2009. In order
to reach this target, GHG emissions in 2050 are expected to decrease 50-85% of
current levels according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
However, all IPCC scenarios indicate significant increase in GHG emissions up to
2050, which presents challenge to the whole world and consequently needs all the
countries and the industries to take their best efforts to tackle GHG emissions.

Although GHG emission from marine bunker fuels is not included in the Kyoto
Protocol (KP) and stands only a small proportion of the total emissions, shipping
discharges a large quantity of GHG into the atmosphere.
Shipping is estimated to have emitted 1,046 million tonnes of CO2 in 2007, which
corresponds to 3.3% of the global emissions during 2007. International shipping
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is estimated to have emitted 870 million tonnes, or about 2.7% of the global
emissions of CO2 in 2007. Mid-range emissions scenarios show that by 2050, in
the absence of policies, CO2 emissions from international shipping may grow by a
factor of 2 to 3 (compared to the emissions in 2007) as a result of the growth.
(Buhaug et al. 2009)

Various studies also show a very aggressive growth of CO2 emissions from shipping
industry as exhibited in figure 1.1.

Figure 1.1 – Projected CO2 emissions from the future fleet from various studies
Source: DNV (2010). Assessment of measures to reduce future CO2 emissions from shipping.
Norway: Author.
Notes: Purple – Buhaug et al. 2009 (high-low); Blue – Endresen et al. 2008 (high-low);
Green – Eyring et al. 2005 (high-low); Black – DNV 2010 (baseline).

Due to the anticipated growth, it would be very difficult to control the GHG
emissions. The 2℃ increase in temperature of UNFCCC combined with challenging
scenarios within shipping sector put the International Maritime Organization (IMO)
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under great pressure. Since then, a series of regulations and measures have been
discussed and adopted by IMO, including technical, operational measures and
market-based measures (MBMs). In July 2011, IMO adopted new regulations on
energy efficiency for ships, adding a new chapter 4 to Annex VI of the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL). It developed the
Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) for new ships, and the Ship Energy
Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) for all ships mandatory. It aims to achieve 50%
CO2 reduction per tonne of cargo with transporting distance of one kilometer by
2050.

Many parties doubt whether implementation of technical and operational related
measures only is enough and whether they can achieve the expected target. Jack
Devanney from Center for Tankship Excellence even argues that the EEDI approach
would not only be a horribly inefficient (high resource cost) means of reducing CO2
emissions, but extremely dangerous in terms of safety and oil pollution (Devanney,
2011). Against this backdrop, IMO along with its Member States are developing
MBMs to try to find the most cost effective means of reducing CO2 emissions from
ships. Maritime Environmental Protection Committee (MEPC) of IMO has already
received a number of proposals, and a working group was established to assess these
proposals. The detailed information could be found in the MEPC files.
1.2 Development of regulations on reduction of GHG emissions from shipping
For the inadequacy of emission reduction provisions in UNFCCC, KP was adopted
in 1997 and entered into force in 2005. It legally binds developed countries to
emission reduction targets. However, GHG emissions from aviation and marine
bunker fuels were left to the International Civil Aviation Organization and the IMO
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respectively in KP. Since then, MEPC has made great efforts to control the GHG
emissions from ships, and in July 2011, a package of technical measures for new
ships and operational reduction measures for all ships over 400 gross tonnage were
adopted by MEPC. The adopted measures added to MARPOL Annex VI
(Regulations on the prevention of air pollution from ships) a new Chapter 4 entitled
“Regulations on energy efficiency for ships”, making mandatory the EEDI, and
SEEMP, which are, consequently, the first ever mandatory international treaty
binding on an entire industry globally.

The EEDI requires a minimum energy efficiency level (CO2 emissions) per
capacity mile (e.g. tonne mile) for different ship type and size segments. With the
level being tightened every five years, the EEDI will stimulate continued technical
development of all the components influencing the fuel efficiency of a ship.
Reduction rates are set until 2025-2030 when a 30% reduction is mandated over
the average efficiency for ships built between 2000 and 2010. The EEDI is
non-prescriptive, performance based tool that leaves the choice of technologies to
use in a specific ship design to the industry. The EEDI has been developed for the
largest and most energy intensive segments of the world merchant fleet and will
embrace about 70% of emissions from new ships.
(IMO, 2010a)

The SEEMP is an operational measure that establishes a mechanism to assist the
shipping industry in achieving cost-effective efficiency improvements in its
operations using the Energy Efficiency Operational Index (EEOI) as a monitoring
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tool and benchmark. It may include slow steaming, optimal trim, hull and propeller
condition monitoring, optimal voyage planning and etc.

The new technical and operational measures are expected to help ship operators save
$34 to 60 billion in fuel costs in 2020, as well as reduce CO2 emissions from
international shipping by up to 180 million tonnes annually by 2020, a figure that, by
2030 will increase to 390 million tonnes (IMO, 2010b). However, it is estimated that
the technical and operational measures are not sufficient to reduce the GHG
emission from international shipping as expected in the projection of the growth of
world seaborne transportation. Hence, MBMs have been considered. Although there
is still a long way to go before finalizing the form that would apply to the shipping
industry, under the pressure of UNFCCC and European Commission (EC), a broad
consensus has been reached among Member States in the latest MEPC meeting that
there is necessity to establish a mandatory global system for collecting accurate data
on CO2 emissions, which could be done through the amendments of MARPOL for
monitoring and reporting fuel consumption of individual ships. We could anticipate
that the relevant regulations will be promulgated very soon.
1.3 Structure and purpose of the dissertation
1.3.1 Structure of the dissertation
The dissertation is comprised of 6 chapters. Chapter 2 makes an introduction on the
economic instruments for CO2 emission reduction, and presents the main proposals
on the IMO’s table. Chapter 3 analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of MBMs.
Questions are raised about the role of the IMO, how to harmonize the contradiction
of UNFCCC’s “common but differentiated responsibility” (CBDR) and IMO’s
non-discriminatory principles? How to avoid the distortion of the Carbon trading
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market? Chapter 4 and 5 mainly focuses on the Chinese market. Through the
calculation of the potential CO2 emissions from Chinese international fleet, we could
identify that China is under a great pressure and would be affected by MBMs
significantly on trading, seaborne transportation and etc. Based on the discussion
about the MBMs, chapter 5 provides several recommendations for the Chinese
government authority, including data collection, comparison and selection of
instruments and establishment of fund in China.
1.3.2 Purpose of the dissertation
The new amendments to MARPOL Annex VI on the energy efficiency for ships
represent the first ever global and legally binding CO2 reduction regime for an
international shipping industry. However, recognizing the potential growth of
shipping associated with economic development, IMO realizes that additional
measures are needed in addition to technical and operational measures. Therefore,
MBMs also have been considered, which could be mainly categorized into three
groups emission charge (Fund), marine emission trading scheme and violence
punishment. Whatever form it takes, it will significantly affect the international
community significantly, especially countries like China.

As a major shipping country, China has to get involved in this process more actively
and contribute our own intelligence. So this dissertation serves firstly as an
introduction of the MBMs to Chinese government authority. MBMs represent the
trend of the future. In adversely, it will go through the negotiations and come into
force, so we have to understand the principles on how it works, what it could be
done and how to bring its best to be in line with our own national interests.
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Secondly, it illustrates a picture, in which the Chinese international shipping get
involved in. The forecast on the development of Chinese international shipping and
GHG emissions makes it very clear that we would be under a great pressure in
following the international standards. We have to be geared up for the introduction of
tougher environmental regulations and provide IMO with more solid reports and
proposals about the issue, considering the interests of developing countries more
carefully and thoroughly.

Thirdly, it provides a hint and inspires more people to do the relevant study and
research. Up till now, there is inadequacy of solid and sound reports about the
MBMs in IMO. The industry needs more talented people to get involved in this study,
and provide the community with more creative and feasible methods.
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Chapter 2 Economic Instruments for CO2 Emission Reduction
MBMs to tackle GHG emissions have been a hot issue both under UNFCCC and
IMO domain at present. As there is still no final conclusion on which form it will be
in the shipping industry. Basically, economic instruments usually come in the form
of emission charges (tax or pollusion levy) and tradable emission permits where, for
example, shipping companies receive an incentive for pollution abatement on a
sustainable basis.
2.1 Emission charges
An effluent charge is a tax or financial penalty imposed on polluters by government
authorities. The charge is specified on the basis of dollars or cents per unit of
effluent emitted into the ambient environment (Hussen, 2004a, p106). It implies, for
instance, that shipowners have to pay for the pollutents emitted into the air by their
ships. Figure 2.1 shows how the companies would have greater incentive to invest in
pollution control technology than under emission standards under the emission
charge regime.
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Figure 2.1 – An effluent charge and a firm’s incentive to invest in new technology
Source: Ma, S. (2013). Maritime Economics. Unpublished lecture handout, World Maritime
University, Malmo, Sweden.

Suppose that there is a shipping company, a polluter, without an emission charge, he
would have emitted a total amount 180 since there is no external cost. If an emission
charge T is imposed, and given the marginal emission control cost being MCC, it
would be the company’s interest to control the emission to 100 as it would cost less
to reduce the emission than to pay the tax.

What happens if the new technology is implemented onboard ship to control CO2
emission? As illustrated by Figure 2.1, the marginal control cost shifts from MCC0 to
MCC1. Before adoption of new technology, the company emitted 100 units, and
controlled 80 units (180-100) of its pollutants. The authority, then, is entitled to
collect tax of $500, represented by A+B+C. For cleaning up 80 units, the company
needs to pay an amount equitable to D+E, Which makes the total expenditure up to
A+B+C+ D+E. Likewise, if the new technology is adopted, area A+B+D will
represent the total expenditure of this company for tax and pollutants cleaning.
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Direct cost-saving would be C+E, with C as tax cost saving and E as saving from
new control method.

It is also clear that if “command-and-control” regulatory standard is enforced, for
instance at level 100, even though the new technology is available, it is most likely
for the company not to apply it and keep its emission at 100 instead of the optimal
point 60. Area C then represents an extra incentive for the shipping company to
invest in new technology.
2.2 Transferable emission permits

Essentially, the main idea behind transferable emission permits is to create a
market for pollution rights. A pollution right simply signifies a permit that consists
of a unit (pound, ton, etc.) of a specific pollutant. Under the transferable emission
permit approach, government authorities basically have two functions. They
determine the total allowable permits, and decide the mechanism to be used to
distribute the initial pollution permits among polluters.
(Hussen, 2004b, p113)
In order to make the transferable emission permits instrument work properly, the
following postulates need to be satisfied:
(1) A polluter, for example, a ship should obtain a legal right to pollute;
(2) These rights are clearly clarified;
(3) Government authorities decide the total permits and assign the initial rights.
Polluters emitting in excess of their allowances are subject to a stiff penalty;
(4) Pollution permits are freely transferable.
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On the above mentioned four conditions, figure 2.2 illustrates how the transferable
emission permits instrument works. Suppose that there are two ships emitting CO2,
without control, both ships would have emitted 300 tons of CO2. To curb the GHG
emission, government authority decides to cut the total emission by half on the basis
of equal criteria, each ship is allocated 150 tons allowances. If, as exhibited by figure
2.2, two ships implement different technologies with different marginal control costs,
there is a possibility that these two ships could be engaged in mutual trading. Given
that both ships discharge 150 tons of CO2 (ship 1 operating at point R, while ship 2
operating at point S), MCCs for the last unit emission for ship 1 and ship 2 are $500
and $2500 respectively. It costs ship 2 five times as much as ship 1. Since permits
are free tradable rights, it would be in the best interest of ship 2 to buy a permit from
ship 1 provided its price is less than $2500. Similarly, ship 1 will be willing to sell a
permit as long as the price is greater than $500. The mutual exchange will continue
until point E, where MCC1 = MCC2. At point E, ship 1 emits 100 tons of CO2, while
ship 2 emits 200 tons of CO2. The total amount of CO2 emitted is, as set by the
government, 300 tons. However, through the transferable emission permits
instrument, ship 2 could buy 50 tons allowances in the market to fill its deficit and
ship 1 could sell 50 tons allowances by investing in new technology, and the whole
industry could achieve its objective in a much more cost-effective method.
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Figure 2.2 - How transferable emission permits works
Source: Hussen, A.M. (2004). Principle of Environmental Economics (2nd ed., pp.113). New York:
Routledge.

2.3 MBMs proposed to IMO
In response to the call for action in resolution A.963 (23), MEPC 55 had approved
the work programme to identify and develop the mechanisms needed to achieve the
limitation or reduction of CO2 emissions from international shipping. The work plan
reiterated the call to consider technical, operational and MBMs for dealing with
GHG emissions. On the one hand, following the second IMO GHG study, EEDI and
SEEMP has been introduced into the revised MARPOL Annex VI and entered into
force on January 2013. On the other hand, MEPC 59 had agreed by overwhelming
majority that MBMs were needed as part of a comprehensive package of measures
for GHG emission reduction. Hence, a dozen of proposals, by the methodology of
fund collection or trade, were submitted to IMO to curb CO2 emission from shipping
industry. A full report of the work undertaken by the Expert Group on feasibility
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study and impact assessment of possible MBMs was submitted to MEPC 61
analyzing the impacts of ten proposed MBMs based on the agreed 9 principles1. A
brief description on these proposals is as follows:

(1) An international Fund for GHG emissions from ships (GHG Fund)
proposed by Cyprus, Denmark, the Marshall Islands, Nigeria and IPTA
(MEPC 60/4/8)
This method would establish a global reduction target for international shipping, set
by either UNFCCC or IMO. Emissions above the target line would be offset largely
by purchasing approved emission reduction credits. The offsetting activities would
be financed by a contribution paid by ships on every tonne of bunker fuel purchased.
It is envisaged that contributions would be collected through bunker fuel suppliers or
via direct payment from shipowners. The contribution rate would be adjusted at
regular intervals to ensure that sufficient funds are available to purchase project
credits to achieve the agreed target line. Any additional funds remaining would be
available for adaptation and mitigation activities via the UNFCCC and R&D and
technical co-operation with the IMO framework.

(2) The United States proposal to reduce GHG emissions from international
shipping, the Ship Efficiency and Credit Trading (SECT) (MEPC 60/4/12)
It is designed to focus on emission reduction activities just in the shipping sector.
Under SECT, all ships, including those in the existing fleet, would be subject to
mandatory energy efficiency standards, rather than a cap on emissions or a surcharge
on fuel. As one means of complying with the standard, SECT would establish an
efficiency-credit trading program. The stringency level of these efficiency standards

1

Referring to MEPC/61/INF.2
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would be based on energy efficiency technology and methods available to ships in
the fleet. These standards would become more stringent over time, as new
technology and methods are introduced. Similar to the EEDI, these efficiency
standards would be based on a reduction from an established baseline and would
establish efficiency standards for both new and existing ships. The SECT is designed
to achieve relative GHG reductions, i.e. reductions in emissions per tonne mile and
not to set an overall target for the sector.

Following the original proposal, The United States made several submissions to
IMO to further detail the proposal. Two major changes were made. First, instead of
using design-based, technical criteria to establish energy efficiency standards, the
revised proposal recognizes the merit in seeking to develop standards based on total
fuel consumption, which captures both technical and operational measures. Second,
the revised proposal calls for a phased approach: a data collection phase, a pilot
phase to test the standards established, and then a full implementation phase.

(3) The Global Emission Trading System (ETS) for international shipping
proposal by Norway (MEPC 61/4/22)
The proposal would set a sector-wide cap on net emissions from international
shipping and establish a trading mechanism to facilitate the necessary emission
reductions, be they in-sector or out-of-sector. The use of out-of-sector credits allows
for further growth of the shipping sector beyond the cap. In addition the auction
revenue would be used to provide for adaptation and mitigation (additional emission
reductions) through UNFCCC processes and R&D of clean technologies within the
maritime sector. A number of allowances (ship emission units) corresponding to the
cap would be released into the market every year. It is proposed that the units would
be released via a global auctioning process. Ships would be required to surrender one
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ship emission unit, or one recognized out-of-sector allowance or one recognized
out-of-sector project credit, for each tonne of CO2 they emit. The ETS would apply
to all CO2 emissions from the use of fossil fuels by ships engaged in international
trade above a certain size threshold. The proposal also indicates that limited
exemptions could be provided for specific voyages to small island developing states
(IMO, 2010c).

In addition to the proposals above, more proposals are on the table as follows:


Leveraged Incentive Scheme (LIS) to improve the energy efficiency of ships
based on the international GHG Fund proposed by Japan;



Achieving reduction in GHG emissions from ships through Port State
arrangements utilizing the ship traffic, energy and environment model, STEEM
(PSL) by Jamaica;



Vessel Efficiency System (VES) proposal by World Shipping Council;



Global Emissions Trading System (ETS) for international shipping proposal by
the United Kingdom;



Further elements for the development of an Emissions Trading System (ETS)
for international shipping by France;



Market-Based Instrument: a penalty on trade and development proposal by the
Bahamas;



A Rebate Mechanism (RM) for a market-based instrument for international
shipping by IUCN.
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Chapter 3 Analysis of MBMs to Control GHG Emissions

3.1 Advantages of MBMs
3.1.1 Cost effectiveness
Compare with the traditional regulatory method, the biggest advantage of MBMs is
cost effectiveness. Figure 3.1 explains the reasons why the uniform standard is not
cost effective. Suppose that there are different technologies to control CO2 emission
applied by two ships, which would result in different marginal control costs. We
assume the total amount of emission is 600 tonnes each year, and the objective of
our government authority is to cut it by half. It means that each ship would have to
control its emission level to 150. For ship1, the total control cost is represented by
area D, while, for ship2, the total cost is covered by areas A+B+C. The total control
cost for these two ships is A+B+C+D. Is this the most economical method to control
the emission? The answer is no. If the MBM is used, two ships could, through
mutual trade or economic incentive, optimize their emission level to 200 and 100
respectively for ship1 and ship2. The total cost was then changed to A+B+D, with a
net saving C. it could be concluded from the figure 3.1 that the most efficient way of
controlling a set amount of emission happens when MCC1 equals MCC2.
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Figure 3.1 - The cost effectiveness of emission standards
Source: Hussen, A.M. (2004). Principle of Environmental Economics (2nd ed., pp.101). New York:
Routledge.

We discussed in section 2.1 that an emission tax instrument would incentivize each
individual ships to adjust its marginal control cost to the tax level. If all ships do this,
then we can deduce that MCCs for all ships are the same, which equals the tax. It is
the perfect condition to allocate the resources in a most cost effective way. For an
emission trade scheme, it works in the same way through the mutual trading to
achieve an equal MCC. So, at this point, we could conclude that MBMs are more
cost-effective than regulatory standards.
3.1.2 Promotion of new technology
As discussed in chapter 2, economic instruments usually come in the form of
emission charges or tradable emission permits where, for example, shipping
companies receive an incentive for pollution abatement on a sustainable basis. And
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most of all, producers are encouraged to adopt new and advanced technologies of
pollution abatement (Ma, 2013, p159). Figure 3.2 helps us to understand the reason
why the regulatory standards discourage ship owners into investing in new
technologies.

Cost

MDC

MCC

MCC1
C
B
0

P2

A
P1

P

CO2 Emission

Figure 3.2 – The effect of the regulatory instrument on the use of new technology
Source: Ma, S. (2013). Maritime Economics. Unpublished lecture handout, World Maritime
University, Malmo, Sweden.

We well understand that without any regulation on the emission control, a ship
would have discharged all its pollutants into the air at point P. We further assume
that through a trial-and-error process, the government authority finally establish the
initial standard at the optimal emission level P1, where MCC and MDC intersect. At
point P1, the total pollution control cost is represented by area A+C. If a ship owner
implements a new technology onboard the ship to control CO2 emission, being
convinced that the cost saving would be bigger than the investment, the MCC will be
reduced to MCC1 most likely. Suppose that the regulatory standard does not change,
then, the net saving for the ship owner is C. However, with the change of MCC, the

18

authority would advocate stricter rules. The new standard will be set at point P2
following the economic rule where MCC and MDC reach the new equilibrium. And
cost saving will be changed to B-C only with new technology.

An important implication could be drawn from the above discussion that the greater
the technology improvement is, the bigger the reduction of the pollution control cost
will be. It means that the standards will get more and more stringent. It is not
difficult to anticipate that with continually developing technology, a break-even
point will be reached, the extra cost represented by area B will exceed cost saving C.
That’s why the shipping industry seems not interested in the more advanced and
latest pollution control technologies.
3.1.2 Other merits of MBM
In addition to the above two merits, MBMs also boast the following advantages:
(1) It requires less administrative intervention and consequently saves administrative
expenditure.
(2) It generates revenues, which could be used in further research and development
of new technologies, to help developing countries to improve their infrastructure,
facilitate implementation of MBMs, and maintain the smooth operation of the
MBMs, etc.
(3) It provides a level playing field for ship owners and countries who committed to
a cleaner and sustainable shipping industry.
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3.2 Uncertainties associated with MBM
3.2.1 The Legal Role of IMO

IMO is the United Nations specialized agency with responsibility for the safety and
security of shipping and the prevention of marine pollution by ships. Its principal
objective is to provide machinery for co-operation among governments in the field
of governmental regulation and practices relating to technical matters of all kinds
affecting shipping engaged in international trade.
(Convention on the IMO, 1948)

It makes the IMO essentially a standard-setting organization. The treaty instruments
adopted by IMO in whatever forms, conventions, protocols, or codes etc, will bind
States only when they agree to be bound by it. It is for Flag States to incorporate
them into their domestic legislations or promulgate national laws to implement the
IMO treaty instruments. There is no authority for IMO as an organization to
implement or enforce any regulations or standards on any ships or any States. The
whole basis of the “regulatory function” of the organization is that it develops, by
international co-operation, standards and regulations which are to be implemented
and enforced by States, individually or collectively, as appropriate (Balkin, 2000).

Shipping is an international industry. The CO2 emission could only be curbed by
following a uniform international standards and regulations. Whether it is in the form
of effluent tax or tradable emission permits, it would be preferable that an
international body is dedicated to set the uniform tax standard or to decide the total
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emission allowances and distribute them. It is likely that one country may set a very
stringent standard, while another country may adopt a less strict standard, it would
leave the country that set a higher standard in a commercial disadvantage position.
Then, does the IMO have the mandate to establish the tax standard or decide and
distribute the emission allowance? IMO’s mandate, as derived from the IMO
convention and United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is
presumably based on the establishment of treaty laws on the general consensus
principle in most cases. The contradiction of the requirement of universal
participation of MBMs and the nature of treaty law, which only bind on countries
who have agreed to be bound by it, brings the IMO in a not favorable position to
implement the MBMs to combat CO2 emission from the international shipping
industry.

I strongly believe that it is the responsibility of each individual State to decide the
level of effluent tax, and emission allowances in the national economic context.
MBMs may work within some regions like EU, but there are lots of uncertainties for
the developing and less developed countries. An irresponsible country may raise the
tax level much higher than optimal level to collect money from the industry. The
emission allowances could also be over-supplied to knock down the carbon market.
Since the shipping is truly a business across borders, MBMs will most probably not
achieve the anticipated effect until the whole industry to form an equal, uniform,
worldwide standard applicable to all States involved in the shipping business.
3.2.2 Relation to UNFCCC
Article 2.2 of KP states “The parties included in Annex I shall pursue limitation or
reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol
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from aviation and marine bunker fuels, working through the International Civil
Aviation Organization and the International Maritime Organization, respectively”
(UN, 1998) There was a hot debate about the question whether this provision applies
to the countries listed in Annex I only or whether it should be adopted across borders
just as other conventions adopted by IMO. We know that IMO is a specialized
agency of the United Nations (UN), and essentially a standard-setting organization.
Only after signing and ratifying a convention, the member state is bound by its
provisions. The problem arises that if the MBM policy adopted by IMO is not
accepted by all of Member States, then the effect of MBM would have been very
limited. The shipping industry is a thoroughly international business. A ship owner
from a developed country could register his ship in a developing country and locate
the headquarter in a third one. In addition, since the ship is sailing internationally,
then, the emission from the ship could not be easily defined. To avoid being bound
by the onerous regulations, a ship owner tends to switch the registry of his ships to
another country. All these issues lead to the complication of the issue under IMO
domain.

Secondly, how an MBM can reconcile both the UNFCCC principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR) with the IMO’s
non-discriminatory approach? In view of the historical contribution to the GHG
emission of developed countries, UNFCCC established the CBDR principle and
demands the developed countries to take the lead in combating climate change and
the adverse effects. When we apply CBDR principle in designing MBMs instrument,
question would arise immediately. How do we implement the CBDR principle to
exempt certain countries from complying with or linking to place where fuel is
bought, or based on ownership of ships? As discussed above, a ship owner could
change the nationality of a ship to another country, or choose to bunker fuel oil at
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places exempting from additional fuel tax. So, MBMs could fall down as clearly
MBMs cannot work properly in an under-competitive market environment.

Some States proposed that global MBMs could be established by compensating the
developing countries properly through a rebate approach. It sounds a reasonable
resolution, but the point is how to quantify the costs and damages incurred following
the MBM. Is the compensation confined to the costs incurred in the shipping sector
or the whole economy? We understand well that some States, especially those reliant
on the shipping industry and developing countries that still need to develop their
economy to improve their citizens’ livelihood, will be affected by MBMs
substantially as a result of increased sea transport freight. Some States even worry
about their food security as the food price would increase as a result of higher freight
due to MBM.

In addition, by implementation of MBMs, ships would be pushed to apply new
technologies to improve the energy efficiency. By now, these new technologies are
owned mostly by developed countries. It will turn out that countries without proper
technologies, mainly developing countries, would have to buy these technologies
from developed countries. The fund collected or compensation paid to developing
countries will eventually flow to developed countries.
3.2.3 Inadequacy of data base
The basis to establish a market-based mechanism and to make it work smoothly is
the correct and abundant data about the fuel consumption and CO2 emission from
international shipping. In IMO second GHG study, two methodologies, activity data
based method and fuel statistics based method, were adopted for the estimation of
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fuel consumption by ships. As illustrated in the report, uncertainties existed in both
methods. For the activity-based model, the greatest uncertainty is the estimates of
engine load factor and of the number of days at sea (engine running hours) (Buhaug
et al. 2009). While for top-down fuel statistics model, the fuel consumption is based
on the reports of the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) and the
International Energy Agency (IEA). Doubts were cast upon the reliability of the
statistics. Firstly, since some countries are not bound by the IEA treaty to provide
data according to their specific methodologies and standards, data for non-member
States could be less accurate. Secondly, IEA database contains fuel bunkering not
only for international marine bunkers but also for domestic and fishing ships. EIA
data includes bunkers to ships and to aircrafts home and abroad. A gap between the
results of the two different methods for the calculation on historical emission is
ranging from 30% to 50%, making neither of them reliable for a credible
market-based mechanism (Buhaug et al. 2009).

$
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Figure 3.3 - The optimal level of effluent charge
Source: Hussen, A.M. (2004). Principle of Environmental Economics (2nd ed., pp.109). New York:
Routledge.
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For the tax-based MBMs, from the economic point of view, the optimal level of
emission tax (T) corresponds to the point, where MCC and MDC intersect with each
other (see figure 3.3). The total amount of CO2 emission should not exceed W, the
optimal level of discharge. MCC here represents the aggregate marginal control cost
for all the international trading ships. Since the rigorous data about CO2 emission
can’t be collected, the real emission tax will always deviate from the optimal level T.
Due to the uncertainty, if the government authority bases the tax level on the MCC,
which turns out to be smaller than the reality MCC1, the allowed CO2 emission W1
would be greater than the optimal level. Although it is certainly that we cannot get
all the information about the collective MCC and MDC to decide the optimal tax
level, but still we have to collect data about ship fuel consumption and CO 2 emission
as much as possible to make the designed tax to be close to T.

For allowance trade scheme, inaccurate quantitative data could easily make the
market fall down. The recent turmoil of EU-ETS market, which I will discuss it in
details in the next chapter, exhibits the importance of accurate measurement
elaborately
3.2.4 Market distortion
MBM is a market instrument to control GHG emissions, and naturally is governed
by the principle of demand and supply for emission allowances, especially in terms
of ETS proposed by EU countries. If the context, on which the policy was based, is
changed, the trading market could be affected significantly and even discourage
industry to control the GHG emission. In the following context, the market distortion
based on the case of EU-ETS will be discussed.
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To facilitate the achievement of Kyoto targets by EU member States, the EU-ETS
was introduced by the Emissions Trading Directive and entered into force on 1
January 2005. The working process has been illustrated in the section “Transferable
emission permits” in the previous section. According to EU directive, the tradable
commodity in the EU-ETS market is the EU CO2 emission allowances (EUA), and
one unit of EUA equals to one tonne of CO2. In 2004, the linking directive was
passed to allow ETS member states to use the reduction through joint
implementation (JI) and clean development mechanism (CDM) instruments to offset
their emission. Consequently, two international credits (ERUs & CERs) were also
allowed to be traded in the market, and could also be transferred to the allowances of
EUA.

Recently, EU-ETS has received a lot of criticisms, and the biggest one is the low
price of EUA. The spot price of EUA has gone through different phases since 2005
(see Figure 3.1). During the first trading period, the EUA price reached price levels
between EUR 20 to EUR 25, but dropped significantly when a surplus of allowances
are available and slumped to level of almost zero at the end of 2007, for banking was
not allowed between first and second trading period. During the second phase, the
EUA price first reached levels of between EUR 25 and EUR 30, but decreased
substantially on two occasions. First it dropped to EUR 10 as a result of the financial
and economic crisis in 2009, which curtailed the demand. A second drop incurred in
2011, when it became clear that the crisis would last longer and that a considerable
surplus of allowances would be built up by the end of the period. This decreased
EUA price further to around EUR 7 by the end of 2012. Meanwhile, CER price
traded at less than EUR 1 at the end of the second phase (European Environment
Agency [EEA], 2013, p.40).
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Figure 3.4 - Price trends for EUAs and CERs, 2005-2012
Source: European Environment Agency. (2013). Trends and projections in Europe 2013. Denmark:
Author.

So if IMO adopt the ETS as the option for the MBM to control GHG in the future,
several questions are needed to be clarified to ensure the MBM function as it should
be.

1. Is ETS confined to the shipping sector or incorporated into other existing ETS
markets?
A large portion of Member States in IMO proposes that the MBM should be
confined to the shipping sector to allow the resources to be utilized by the shipping
industry only. And it could also push the industry to reduce GHG emission by itself
instead of buying allowances from other sectors. If so, the market would be
relatively small and be less vulnerable to the world economic context just as the case
of EU-ETS. Consequently, it could result in the manipulation of the market.

If the MBM is incorporated into other existing markets or could buy allowances
from other sectors, it could be influenced easily by external factors such as tumbling
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price of EU-ETS. International shipping emitted approximately 870 million tones of
CO2, accounting for about 2.7% of the global emission in 2007, while in the same
year EU-ETS issued 2193 million EUAs for free, and the cumulated surplus stood at
1754 million at the end of 2012. It would just incentivize ship owners to buy cheap
emission allowances rather than improve the ship energy efficiency.

By comparing the both options, I believe the first choice would be a better start in
the pilot phase, as long as we could get as much as possible the information about
damage and total social control cost, through which we could decide the optimal
level of emission allowances.

2. How do we design the mechanism to decide and distribute the emission
allowances?
“As a policy instrument designed to curb the abuse of the natural environment, the
success of a transferable permit scheme very much depends on the total size of
pollution permits” (Hussen, 2004c, p.113). The data about the CO2 emission of each
ship is very important for the success of ETS instrument. As to today, Member
States are still discussing about the amendments to MARPOL for monitoring and
reporting of individual ships’ fuel consumption2. There is simply no ground or
foundation to build an ETS instrument to curb CO2 emission.

Although article 2.2 of KP states that the reduction of GHG emissions from marine
bunker fuel shall be pursued through IMO, it does not mean that IMO has the
mandate to decide and distribute the emission allowances for individual countries. In
2

Following the implementation of regulation of monitoring, reporting and verification of CO2 emissions (MRV)
from maritime transportation in EU, many members and ICS proposed a framework for a global data collection
system for maritime transport covering fuel consumption, CO 2 emissions and energy efficiency at MEPC 66
meeting.

28

my opinion, it is IMO’s task to draft the technical conventions and the individual
States to decide if participate in a MBM instrument or not, and to distribute the
emission allowances to its ship owners and companies. If this is true, then we have
to bear in mind the possibility that there may be some irresponsible States, who
would issue unlimited allowances to exchange money. Market will fall down and
collapse eventually.
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Chapter 4 Analysis of CO2 Emissions from Chinese International
Fleet

4.1 Perspective of Chinese international seaborne trade and fleet
4.1.1 Developments in international seaborne trade
GHG emission from shipping is directly linked to the seaborne transportation, which
is driven by the world economy. Due to the economic crises starting in 2008 and
international imbalance, the world economy still has a very slack performance.
Economic growth in China reached 7.7 % in 2013, the lowest rate in the decade.
However, the total value of import and export of China was still 4.16 trillion dollars,
making up about 12% of whole world in 2013.
Table 4.1 – World economic growth 2008-2013 (Annual percentage change)
Country/Region

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

World
United States
Japan
EU
China
India
South Korea
Brazil
Russia

1.5
-0.3
-1.0
0.3
9.6
6.2
2.3
5.2
5.2

-2.2
-3.1
-5.5
-4.3
9.2
5.0
0.3
-0.3
-7.8

4.1
2.4
4.7
2.1
10.4
11.2
6.3
7.5
4.5

2.8
1.8
-0.6
1.6
9.3
7.7
3.7
2.7
4.3

2.2
2.2
1.9
-0.3
7.8
3.8
2.0
0.9
3.4

2.1
1.7
1.9
-0.2
7.7
5.2
2.3
2.5
2.5

Source: UNCTAD (2013). Review of maritime transport 2013, Switzerland: Author.
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Figure 4.1- Value of annual cargo import/export 2009-2013 (China)
Source: Compiled by author based on statistics from national bureau of statistics of China
(2014).

With the strong demand for crude oil, raw materials, grain etc., the annual growth
rate of seaborne trade looks still very affirmative, with an average 10% of annual
growth rate. As to today, of top 10 world container ports, 7 of them are located in
China. From these statistics, we could well predict that, in the near future, the
booming economy of China will stimulate the international trade with other regions
and countries. In return, more ships will come to China, especially those mega ships
transporting bulk cargo. To curb GHG emissions, China obviously has an important
role to play.
Table 4.2 - Volume of seaborne trade 2004-2013 (China)
Year Volume of Annual
Volume of
Annual
Container
Annual
Port
percentage international percentag
trade
percentage
handling change
trade (100
e change (10000TEU) change
（100
(%)
million
(%)
(%)
million
tonnes）
tonnes）
106.1
8.5
33.1
9.2
18 878
6.7
2013
97.4
6.8
30.1
8.8
17 651
8.1
2012
90.7
11.9
27.5
10.8
16 231
11.4
2011
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2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004

80.2
69.1
58.7
52.1
45.6
49.0
40.0

15.0
8.2
11.5
13.4
15.6
17.7
21.3

24.6
21.4
19.2
17.8
15.7
13.6
11.5

13.6
8.6
7.0
12.6
16.8
18.0
18.4

14 500
12 082
12 835
11 179
9 300

18.8
5.8
12.2
21.5
23.0

6 150

Source: Compiled by author based on statistics from national bureau of statistics of China
(2014).

4.1.2 Structure and ownership of Chinese international fleet
As of 1 January 2013, China has become the largest ship-owning country in terms of
vessel quantity, with 5,313 ocean-going merchant ships, out of which about half fly
the national Chinese flag. This makes more nationally flagged Chinese-owned ships
than nationally flagged ship from Greece, Japan and Germany combined (UNCTAD,
2013). The Deadweight tonnage reached around 190 million tonnes. Table 4.3
provides the profile of top 10 ship-owning countries and their deadweight tonnage.
Table 4.3 - Top 10 countries and territories with the largest owned fleets, as of 1
January 2013 (Dwt)
Number of vessels
Country
or
territory
of
ownershi
p1

Natio
nal
flag

Foreig
n and
intern
ationa
l flag2

Greece

825

2 870

Japan

738
2 665

China

Total

Deadweight tonnage
National
flag

Foreign
and
internati
onal flag

3 695

69 644 624

175 205 954

244 850 578

71.56

15.17

3 253

3 991

17 216 128

206 598 880

223 815 008

92.31

13.87

2 648

5 313

66 936 002

123 142 833

190 078 835

64.79

11.78

32

Total

Foreig Total
n and
as a
intern perce
ationa ntage
l flag
of
as a world
perce
ntage
of
total

Germany

396

3 437

3 833

16 641 757

109 136 771

125 778 528

86.77

7.79

Republic
of Korea

764

812

1 576

16 624 445

58 471 361

75 095 806

77.86

4.65

1 090

798

1 888

32 711 136

31 441 668

64 152 804

49.01

3.98

United
States

768

1 175

1 943

8 671 669

49 606 395

58 278 064

85.12

3.61

United
Kingdom

415

822

1 237

10 447 630

39 857 066

50 304 696

79.23

3.12

Norway

414

1 494

1 908

2 190 036

43 802 209

45 992 245

95.24

2.85

Taiwan
Province
of China

102

712

814

3 311 133

40 948 712

44 259 845

92.52

2.74

Singapore

Total

24 290

1 122 606 409

69.56

Source: UNCTAD (2013). Review of maritime transport 2013, Switzerland: Author.
Note: Vessels of 1000 GT and above, ranked by deadweight tonnage.

As for the Flags of registration, China ranks No. 8, representing 4.29% of world total
vessels, and if we add the fleet registering in Hong Kong (China), the share will
reach 6.84%, becoming the second largest registry country in the world. Table 4.4
shows the details of the 10 flags of registration with the largest registered fleets. It
shows that China registry also has a very high year-on-year growth rate, increasing
by 16.87% and 9.83% respectively for Hong Kong special administrative region and
mainland China.
Table 4.4 - Top 10 flags of registration of the world as of 1 January 2013 (Dwt)

Flag of
registration

Number
of
vessels

Share of
world
total,
vessels

Deadwei

Share of

ght

world

tonnage(

total

thousan

(Percent

ds dwt)

age dwt)

Cumulat
ed share
(Percent
age dwt)

National
ownersh
ip
(percent
age)

Dwt
growth
2013/201
2
(percent
age)

Panama

8 580

9.87

350 506

21.52

21.52

0.14

5.03

Liberia

3 144

3.62

198 032

12.16

33.68

0.01

5.83

Marshall Islands

2 064

2.37

140 016

8.60

42.27

0.11

11.08

Hong Kong
(China)

2 221

2.55

129 806

7.97

50.24

12.15

16.87

33

Singapore

3 339

3.84

89 697

5.51

55.75

36.60

16.62

Greece

1 551

1.78

75 424

4.63

60.38

92.60

5.13

Bahamas

1 446

1.66

73 702

4.52

64.91

1.18

1.44

Malta

1 794

2.06

68 831

4.23

69.13

0.35

8.18

China

3 727

4.29

68 642

4.21

73.35

98.18

9.83

Cyprus

1 030

1.18

31 706

1.95

75.29

19.51

7.61

28 896

33.22

Total

75.30

Source: UNCTAD (2013). Review of maritime transport 2013, Switzerland: Author.
Note: Propelled seagoing merchant vessels of 100 GT and above; ranked by deadweight tonnage.

From table 4.3 and table 4.4, we could identify that Chinese international fleet
(including Hong Kong) accounts for a large portion of world fleet. Ships under
China’s control makes 13.29% of total world tonnage and 6.84% of total world
vessels are registered in China. Considering that the age of ships are relatively old
and individual tonnage is small, ships are not as energy efficient as those of many
counterparts’. If MBMs are going to be implemented in the shipping industry either
in form of emission levy or tradable emission permits, China will be definitely
influenced significantly.
4.2 Scenarios for future emissions from international shipping of Chinese fleet
To predict the CO2 emissions from Chinese international shipping of year 2014-2050
is a very difficult task as it involves so many uncertain factors over such a long span.
Hence, methodology of scenarios planning, developed by IPCC, is applied, which is
a common tool for researchers evaluating uncertain futures3. The prediction thus is
based on these scenarios.

As recommended in “2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas
3

In 1992, the IPCC began to develop a set of emissions scenarios that would provide both a contextual setting
and emissions data for their climate models. The main scenarios are named A1F1, A1B, A1T, A2, B1 and B2,
according to different driving forces, including population, economy, technology, energy, land-use, and
agriculture
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Inventories”, the most common methodology used to predict CO2 emission is to
combine information on the extent to which a human activity takes place (called
activity data or AD) with coefficients which quantify the emissions or removals per
unit activity. These are called emission factors (EF). The basic equation is therefore:
(1)
In shipping sector, activity data is represented as fuel consumption, and is
determined by the demand of transport and transport efficiency. Formula (1) then
could be transformed into formula (2):
(2)
TD: Turnover of seaborne transportation; TE: Transport efficiency.
4.2.1 Determination of parameters
4.2.1.1 Turnover of Chinese international seaborne trade
(1) Turnover prediction synchronized with the world seaborne trade
“IMO GHG Study 2009” made a world seaborne trade turnover prediction based on
the six different scenarios, among which A1B had the biggest annual growth rate at
3.3%, while B2 had the lowest growth rate standing at 2.7%. In this paper, the annual
growth rate of Chinese international seaborne trade is assumed to be synchronized
with the development of world seaborne trade. It means that the growth rate under
six different scenarios prescribed by IMO will be adopted as Chinese seaborne trade
growth rate, which were described in Table 4.5.
Table 4.5 - Annual growth rate of Chinese international seaborne trade
Annual average growth in world GDP for year 2000-2050
A1B
A1F
A1T
A2
B1
B2
GDP
3.9%
4.0%
3.6%
2.4%
3.3%
2.7%
Base
3.3%
3.3%
3.3%
2.6%
2.5%
2.1%
Total
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transport High
Low
demand

5.3%
1.5%

5.3%
1.5%

5.4%
1.5%

4.2%
1.2%

4.1%
1.1%

3.5%
0.9%

Source: IMO GHG Study 2009

(2) Turnover prediction based on the annual growth rate of Chinese GDP
The second approach is based on the annual growth rate of Chinese GDP, as
statistics clearly show that the international seaborne trade is highly related with the
level of economic development. Formula 3 shows their relationship:
(3)

Q: Chinese international seaborne trade, GDP: Chinese Gross Domestic Product
According to the prediction of Chinese GDP development in the future made by
Tsinghua University in 2011, the average annual growth rate is estimated at 9%
between 2010 and 2020, 6% between 2020 and 2035, and 3.8% for the period of
year 2035-2050. Therefore, according to model (3), the average growth rate of
Chinese international seaborne trade equals 7.83% between 2014 and 2019, 5.23%
between 2020 and 2034, and 3.31% between 2035 and 2050.
4.2.1.2 Transport efficiency
“IMO GHG Study 2009” concluded that, under the baseline scenario, transport
efficiency for ocean-going shipping could be improved by 12% and 39% respectively
by year 2020 and 2050. The energy consumption per unit for Chinese ocean-going
ships was 2.479 kg/ (kt.km) 2007 based on annual “Highway and waterway
transportation industry Statistical Bulletin” issued by China’s ministry of
transportation. According to this benchmark, the average annual increase of transport
efficiency of Chinese ocean-going ships between 2008 and 2020 will be 1.27%, and
1.21% between 2020 and 2050. Accordingly, the energy consumption per unit will be
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2.181 kg/ (kt.km) in 2020 and 1.512 kg/ (kt.km) in 2050.
4.2.1.3 CO2 emission factor
Fuel-based CO2 emission factors are conversion values that are used to calculate
emission, based on consumed fuel. Default emission factors prepared by Lloyd’s
Register are used as recommended by IPCC. Because the ocean-going ships are
mainly equipped with low and medium speed diesel engines for propulsion and
generators, which burn HFO or DO, so, according to Lloyd’s Register’s database,
emission factor for HFO is 3.190 kg/tonne of fuel, and 3.130 kg/tonne of fuel for DO.
In the near future, marine fuel oil will still dominate the shipping market, in our
work, we adopt marine fuel oil as the main fuel source for emission prediction.
4.2.2 Prediction of CO2 emission from Chinese international fleet
As being analyzed above, future CO2 emission of Chinese international fleet is
related to the future seaborne trade, transportation efficiency and CO2 emission
factor of fuel oil. CO2 emissions of period 2010-2050 are predicted based on the
formula 2 under different scenarios.
4.2.2.1 CO2 emission with a basic transportation demand
Under this scenario, we assume that the Chinese international seaborne
transportation increases with a basic speed same as world transportation demand.
The statistic shows that inflection point of CO2 emission of Chinese international
seaborne trade will not be realized till 2050. Under scenario A1, CO2 emission of
year 2020 will increase by 15% compared with year 2010, and will ascend further to
111% in 2050. For scenarios A2, B1, and B2, figures witness a rather moderate
increase. Table 4.6 exhibits the details.
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Table 4.6 - CO2 emission with a base speed
Year
A1B
A1F
A1T
3569
3569
3569
2010
4346
4346
4346
2020
7978
7978
7978
2050

A2
3569
4060
6079

Unit: million tonne
B1
B2
3569
3569
4021
3866
5846
5000

Source: Compiled by author (2014)

4.2.2.2 CO2 emission with a high transportation demand
Due to high seaborne transportation demand, CO2 emission will increase
continuously. A1T scenario has soared, with an average annual increase rate 3.68%
between 2010 and 2050.
Table 4.7 - CO2 emission with a high speed
Year
A1B
A1F
A1T
3569
3569
3569
2010
5246
5246
5314
2020
17 181
17 181
17 845
2050

A2
3569
4740
11 288

Unit: million tonne
B1
B2
3569
3569
4694
4431
10 863
8 620

Source: Compiled by author (2014)

4.2.2.3 CO2 emission with a low transportation demand
With a low transportation demand, in the years 2010-2050, CO2 emission grows
quite marginally, with an average annual growth rate 0.1%. A2, B1 and B2 all
witness a decline, as the transportation demand annual growth is countered by the
improvement of transportation efficiency.
Table 4.8 - CO2 emission with a low speed
Year
A1B
A1F
A1T
3569
3569
3569
2010
3645
3645
3645
2020
3950
3950
3950
2050
Source: Compiled by author (2014)
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A2
3569
3539
3509

Unit: million tonne
B1
B2
3569
3569
3504
3435
3372
3116

4.2.2.4 CO2 emission with the Chinese GDP growth speed
Since the average growth rate of Chinese economy is higher than that of the world
economy, and the seaborne transportation is highly related to the economic
development, CO2 emission was calculated under the Chinese growth speed. The
results show a similar pattern as the scenario with a high growth rate. Table 4.9
illustrates the details.
Table 4.9 - CO2 emission with the Chinese growth speed
Unit: million tonne
A1B(high transportation demand )
Year
Chinese growth rate
3569
3569
2010
5264
6529
2020
7809
9621
2030
11 583
12 693
2040
17 181
155 557
2050
Source: Compiled by author (2014)

4.2.3 Conclusion
Statistics clearly demonstrate that if the seaborne transportation demand grows with
high, base or Chinese speed, the CO2 emission of Chinese international seaborne
trade will arise between 2020 and 2050 without inflection point. While CO2 emission
will only decline if the transportation demand is weak and A2, B1 and B2 scenarios
all will go through a decline.

We could identify that the future economic developing pattern has a huge impact on
the shipping CO2 emission. For China, the CO2 emission will grow faster than the
world seaborne trade. As indicated in scenario A1T, the CO2 emission from Chinese
international seaborne trade will increase 39.3% in 2020 and 355% in 2050 based on
year 2007. While under the same scenario, CO2 emission of world shipping will
grow 21.6% in 2020 compared to 2007. Therefore, if MBMs are going to be
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implemented world widely for the shipping sector, Chinese shipping industry will
suffer more than other counterparts.
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Chapter 5 How to Meet the Challenge of MBM for Chinese
International Fleet

5.1 Analysis of the context
5.1.1 International developing Trend

Human influence has been detected in warming of the atmosphere and the ocean, in
changes in the global water cycle, in reductions in snow and ice, in global mean sea
level rise, and in changes in some climate extremes. It is extremely likely that human
influence has been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th
century.
(IPCC, 2013)
In response to the great challenge posed by climate change, the international
communities have been forged together and made a great progress under UNFCCC.
The latest Warsaw conference 2013 agreed on a time plan for countries to table their
contributions to reducing or limiting GHG emissions under a new global climate
agreement to be adopted in 2015. It also agreed upon ways to accelerate efforts to
deepen emission cuts over the rest of this decade and set up a mechanism to address
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losses and damage caused by climate change in vulnerable developing countries (EC,
2013a).
Within IMO scope, during the latest MEPC 66 meeting, Air pollution and energy
efficiency and reduction of GHG emissions from ships once again attracted wide
attention. Many States and institutions put forward their proposals about the
establishment of a data collection system for energy efficiency, commenting on the
documents of MEPC 65/4/19 and MEPC 65/4/304. Different attitudes were observed
that developed countries were very aggressive about the implementation of a data
collection and reporting mechanism, while developing countries were very prudent.
India asked Members to focus on the existing technical and operational measures,
and China expressed the view that the MRV data collection mechanism should be
discussed in more details and requires further study of the methodologies. Although
there is still some disagreement about which method and to what extent the
mechanism would be, with the escalation of the concerns about the global warming
and more often extreme weather phenomenon, we could well expect that this new
requirement will soon be realized through amendment to MARPOL Annex VI or in
some other form.
Besides, some regional actions also have a significant impact on the international
shipping industry. In June 2013, European Commission issued a proposal for a
regulation on the monitoring, reporting and verification of CO2 emissions (MRV)
from maritime transportation. It covers all ships regardless of their flags trading
intra-EU voyage, voyages from the last non-EU port to the first EU port of call and
voyages from an EU port to the next non-EU port of call. And France also issued a
4

MEPC 65/4/19 (United States) proposed to enhance energy efficiency in international shipping through a
phased approach, and the commenting document MEPC 65/4/30 (Belgium et al.) supporting the development
of technical and operational measures to increase the energy efficiency of ships.
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national legislation that ship operators are required as of 1 October 2013 to disclose
the quantity of CO2 emitted during transport services. The new CO2 emission
disclosure requirement applies to any public or private personnel, organizing or
selling transport services for passengers, goods or moving purposes, carrying cargo
using one or several means of transport, departing from or travelling to a location in
France, with the exception of transport services organized by public or private
persons for their own behalf.
5.1.2 Domestic Context
China’s soaring GHG emissions over the last decade have contributed to 65% of the
world’s emission growth. In 2010, its CO2 emissions from burning fossil fuels
accounted for about a quarter of global emissions. What is worse, with further
economic development that heavily relies on the energy use, China’s CO2 emissions
will keep rising at a fast pace. The IEA and EIA predict that China will continue to
be the fastest-growing major emitter from 2010-2020, contributing to between 49%
and 69% of the global CO2 emissions increase (Yang et al, 2014a). Although China
is not a Party to Annex I to the Kyoto Protocol, to tackle GHG emissions, China
pledged to cut its CO2 emissions per unit of GDP by 40% to 45% from the 2005
level by 2020 in Copenhagen Summit 2009.
With the high pace growth of Chinese economy and energy consumption, could the
2020 Copenhagen CO2 emission commitment be met by 2020? The research paper
from Tsinghua University indicated a pessimistic result, showing that China’s
carbon intensity (CO2 emission/ GDP) is projected to decline by only 33%, and CO2
emission will increase by about 4.31 to 5.32 billion metric tons from 2011 to 2020
(see figure 5.1) (Yang et al, 2014b).
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Figure 5.1 – Emission forecast up to 2020 using the best forecasting model
Source: Yang, Y. & Zhang, J.J. & Wang, C. (2014). Is China on track to comply with its 2020
Copenhagen Carbon intensity commitment? Retrieved April 26, 2014 from the World Wide Web:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2346516
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In meeting the big challenges ahead, Chinese government has been taking actions
and will continue to step up its efforts to tackle CO2 emission. Following the 12th
Five-Year Plan, in which targets was clearly set about the carbon intensity, a series
of specific working plans and regulations have been developed both from national
and provincial levels such as “National Plan for Climate Change 2012-2020”, “12th
Five-Year National Scheme for GHG Emission”, “National Strategy to adapt to the
Climate Change ” etc. And since 2012, seven provinces and cities5 have been
granted the permits to develop the CO2 emission allowances trading scheme. As for
Shenzhen trading platform, the overall turnover of Carbon trading has exceeded
110,000 tons, valued 700 million Yuan since its operation from June 2013 (National
Development and Reform Commission [NDRC], 2013).
5.2 Proposals for Chinese international trading ships
5.2.1 Data Collection
Today, the precise amount of CO2 and other GHG emissions from seaborne
transportation is not known due to the lack of monitoring and reporting of such
emissions. EC identified that a robust system for MRV of GHG emissions from
maritime transport is a prerequisite for any MBMs or efficiency standards.
Furthermore, a robust MRV system should contribute to the removal of market
barriers, especially those barriers related to the lack of information on ship efficiency
(EC, 2013b). Since Member States in IMO are still debating and have not achieved
the consensus of the finalized form of MBMs and the timetable of implementation,
the introduction of MRV could gain more time for further discussion and
consideration on the MBMs, efficiency standards, and etc.

5

These seven trial trading places are Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, Shenzhen, Guangdong Province,
and Hubei Province.
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At the latest MEPC 66 meeting, a number of delegations expressed the view that the
development of a data collection system of collecting accurate figures for CO2
emissions and fuel consumption of international shipping is of top priority. As
mentioned in section 5.1, in 2013, both EC and some individual countries have taken
actions about the MRV of CO2 emission from shipping, so as a major shipping
country, what China should do to be better prepared for the coming MBMs?

First, efforts should be made to develop the appropriate method and procedure to
collect CO2 emission data and to figure out what is the actual CO2 emission level of
Chinese fleet. To be better and more effective of protecting Chinese shipping
industry, we should get involved in the establishment of the mechanism of MRV of
CO2 emissions more actively by providing more reliable and first-hand data for IMO.
In January 2013, amendments to Annex VI of MARPOL 73/78 entered into force
(not based on the consensus), including the application of EEDI to new ships, and
the mandatory use of SEEMP for the existing ships. Although China together with
many other developing countries opposed the amendments, it was still adopted as we
do not have enough solid evidences to challenge the average level of ship efficiency,
technological formula for calculation of EEDI and other coefficients. Simply we are
yet well prepared.

Second, how to collect the data? CO2 emission is calculated by multiplying fuel
consumption with emission factor. Emission factor is based on the latest IPCC
values, while fuel consumption could be measured by several different methods:
(1) Bunker Fuel Delivery Note (BDN) and periodic stock takes of fuel tanks;
(2) Bunker fuel tank monitoring on board;
(3) Flow meters for applicable combustion processes;
(4) Direct emissions measurements.
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Although methods (1) and (2) are not as accurate as (3) and (4), obviously, they are
much cheaper as extra equipments are not needed to be installed onboard. Seeing the
current economic environment, it is much easier for shipping companies or operators
to accept them. So, I would like to recommend the first method, BDN and periodic
stock takes of fuel tanks, to be adopted. It is not only easy to be implemented since
ships are already required keeping BDNs onboard for at least three years for
verification by MARPOL and documenting certain entries in the log books by
SOLAS, but also it does not add any additional cost for shipping companies. Ships
could be monitored and verified through the existing port state control and flag state
control schemes.

Third, time also plays a very important role in the data-collecting. At MEPC 66, we
identified, most likely, that a ship energy efficiency data collection system would
come into force in the near future. By then, most of ocean-going ships would have
been forced to implement the policy, including Chinese fleet. Consequently, action is
badly needed. Table 5.1 shows the proposed timetable for domestic reporting
scheme.
Table 5.1 – Timetable for domestic reporting scheme
Time
By Dec. 2014

Jan.2015-Dec. 2015

Action

Stakeholder



Publish the regulations and
establish the proper data
collection system based on
the existing BDN, Oil
Record Book, SEEMP and
national ship inspection data
system.

Government
Authority



Feedbacks and advices from
ships and companies.

Ship &
Company



Pilot

Government

operation

to
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full

Remark
The system prefer
to base on the
existing
instruments and
does not impose
too much new costs
on government and
ships.

Data reporting and

Jan. 2016-

implementation.

Authority



Ship and Company report the
data to Maritime Safety
Administration periodically
following the proper format.

Ship
Company



Adjust the system to
synchronize with IMO policy
if needed.

Government
Authority



Analyze the data and
calculate the ship energy
efficacy
of
Chinese
international and domestic
fleet respectively.

Government
Authority &
Academy
Institutions

Forward
reports
and
proposals to IMO if possible
to express our achievements
and interests.

Government



collecting could be
integrated into the
existing “Ship
permit to sail”
system.
If IMO adopt any
policy, we could
adjust our system
to correspond to the
IMO’s.
Sound data and
report earn merits
for our fleets on the
establishment of
efficiency baseline
in IMO.

Source: Compiled by author (2014).

Lastly, China along with many other countries have great concerns about the safety
of information. The disclosure of data could put the developing nations in a
disadvantageous position in the international market. One probable solution, I
believe, is that the Member States collect the data from the domestic owners and
operators, and report it to IMO annually. IMO has the responsibility to keep the data
safe and not to be used for any commercial purpose. IMO could publish an annual
report about the fuel consumption and CO2 emissions from international shipping in
a general approach, without mentioning any particular nation or ship owner. This
approach could protect the less energy efficient owners and countries from being
exposed.

Abundant and reliable data provides a good foundation for any further development
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of measures to enhance ship energy efficiency by facilitating the establishment of
ship efficiency baselines. It helps the industry to track the ship energy efficiency and
find the potential of possible GHG emissions cutting. The international community,
especially big shipping countries like China, needs a robust data collecting system to
identify the Carbon foot print of seaborne transportation.

I believe that with reliable data, the optimal level of tax and CO2 emission
allowances would be identified, and MBMs would be implemented in the maritime
sector, just like the shore-based power plant and air industries.
5.2.2 Comparison of Tax and Trade
Until MEPC 66, IMO has received a bunch of proposals of MBMs to tackle GHG
emissions from international shipping, including GHG Fund, METS, SECT, LIS,
RM and etc (see chapter 2). Basically, they could be grouped into three main
categories, emission charge, emission trading scheme and mechanism based on ship
energy efficiency. Since the third group is not a pure market-based mechanism, I will
analyze emission charge and emission trading scheme in this chapter primarily.

Although emission charge and emission trading scheme is alike in one important
way, representing a decentralized and cost-effective approach to GHG emissions, we
could still identify many differences between them. Table 5.2 exhibits a horizontal
comparison between these two mechanisms in a qualitative way based purely on the
author’s personal opinion.
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Table 5.2 – Comparison of Emission charge and ETS
Main
Emission Permits
Emission Charge
Criterion
Trade

1

Environment
effectiveness
(GHG reduction
certainty)

2

Cost
effectiveness

3

Higher certainty of
CO2 reduction, but
the arbitrary cap is
rather difficult to set.
Too much permits
could let to price
collapse as EU-ETS,
and give a ship an
incentive to pollute.

Yes

Yes

Relative high. Need to
monitor all pollution
sources and enforce the
emission charge.

Low, the market will
allocate the permits
automatically through
price instrument.

High, the tax level is
fixed, the investment and
expenditure could be
well estimated.

Low, the price of
permit fluctuates
dramatically as been
proven by the existing
markets.

Reasonable, discussed in
above section.

High, discussed in
above section.

Reasonable, referring to
IOPC fund.

Low, works properly
in individual country,
like US using ETS to
tackle SO2 emission
successfully, but a big
question mark if
implement it globally.

Administrative
burden

4

Certainty of cost
for the industry

5

Incentive for
new technology

6

Less certainty than ETS.
It is through tax lever to
influence the ship
emission level. Fuel
price, technology
innovation, economic
environment etc. could
have a big influence.

Practical
feasibility
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Remarks
The optimal level
of tax or total
emission permits
is very important
to determine the
success of the
schemes.

In reality, it may
cost government
authority a big
fortune to
establish ETS
market, to
monitor
pollution, to
prevent leakage,
etc.

ETS would most
likely be less
effective due to
high enforcement
and monitoring
costs of a
pollution problem
with a global
dimension.

7

8

9

Revenue
generated

Yes, the revenue could be
used to compensate
developing countries,
research & development
of new technology, cover
administrative costs and
etc.

Yes, if permits are
distributed through
auction, then revenues
are raised.

Risk of leakage

Average, depends on the
methods of collecting
charge. Less if collected
through bunker suppliers
or refineries.

High, as already
documented in
EU-ETS case.

Neutral

Distortion may be
caused. Ships would
most likely divert
their routes to those
countries, exempted
from ETS scheme.

Impact on
developing
countries

As most of new
technologies are
mastered by
developed
countries, without
transfer of these
technologies
freely,
implementation
of MBM could
put the
developing
countries in a less
competitive
position.

Source: Compiled by author (2014).

From Table 5.2, we could find that both mechanisms have advantages and
disadvantages. If we have to choose, the best form in line with our interests,
emission charge seems to be the best choice.

Firstly, it is relatively easy to be implemented and administered. From the
perspective of practical feasibility, the emission charge is more reasonable than the
trading mechanism. Under the current legislative framework, systems have been
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established and working smoothly that all ships entering and leaving ports need to
report to the maritime safety administration and are subject to port fees. If the
emission charge mechanism is adopted, we could consider adding the charge to the
existing system to save costs. To prevent the carbon leakage, the tax could be
collected from the bunker suppliers or even refineries with a diminishing number of
direct participants.

Secondly, we well understand that nowadays most of new technologies tackling
GHG emissions are mastered by developed countries like EU Members. Their ships
are relatively more energy efficient than those of developing countries. If a trading
scheme is adopted, as one could imagine, less energy efficient shipping companies
will turn to more efficient shipping companies for permits. It means that actually
developing countries will pay money to developed countries for the permits. Some
countries may argue that exemptions could be given to the less developed countries
to counter the adverse impacts on them. Shipping is truly an international business,
in which ships could easily change its registry into another country, man it with
seafarers from different countries and trade internationally, so the carbon leakage
will apparently unavoidable in this case which could lead to the breakdown of the
whole system.

Thirdly, charter party makes the trading scheme too complex to be adopted. When a
ship is under a bareboat or time charter party, charterer actually is the acting ship
owner. He decides where the ship goes, and which way or at what speed, the ship
should be operated. This is recognized in the charter party that the fuel expense is
put under the charterer’s account. If the emission trading scheme is adopted, the
owner will be required to be responsible for all the emissions from his ships, even
though sometimes the ship is not under his direct control. This would put the owner
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in the untenable position of being responsible for emissions from bunkers which
aren’t his, and permit expenses over which he has no control, and which in many
cases aren’t known until well after the charter party is complete. The choice is either
a legal ﬁasco or an administrative mess. An emission charge scheme could avoid
these problems, since it care less who purchases the fuel or how it changes hands
on-board (Devanney, 2011)

Lastly, the emission charge generates revenues while controlling GHG emission. The
tax imposed universally on all ships could not only prevent carbon leakage, but also
could generate revenues, which in return could be used to compensate and help
developing countries to advance their technologies. It justifies both IMO nondiscriminatory and UNFCCC’s CBDR principle to the best. Money flowing into new
technology mastering countries is no new phenomenon. As for designing the
emission charge or fund mechanism, we need to pay special attention to the fund
distribution mechanism and technology transfer matters.
5.2.3 Establishment of Fund in China
UNFCCC established a Green Climate Fund in 2011 during Durban conference
(COP17). The Green Climate Fund aims to generate up to 100 billion dollars per
year by 2020 in order to help mitigate and adaptat projects in developing nations.
Although aviation and shipping industry have not been clarified as potential
candidates for the fund at moment, there is a high potential that shipping would
eventually appear on the list of contributors through the linkage with potential
market-based mechanisms. Compared with the tradable emission permits scheme, an
emission charge scheme is more straight forward and feasible for the shipping for the
time being. Therefor, if IMO chooses to establish a similar green climate fund, the
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establishment of fund in China would be strongly recommended.
First of all, whether the fund is going to be collected from carriers or sea
transportation consumers, with a strong performance of Chinese economy, China
will, undoubtedly, become a major contributor to the fund if the levy is applied to all
ships universally irrespective of their flags. Taking containerized cargo for example,
table 5.3 illustrates the top 10 countries with the biggest container handling turnover.
In the year 2012, China loaded and uploaded 155,017 TEUs, surpassing the second
largest container handler –USA by almost three times which accounted for 25.8% of
world total number. From the perspective of development, Figure 5.1 shows that,
from 2003 to 2012, with some fluctuation between 2008 and 2009 due to world
economic crisis, China presented a very strong increasing trend.
Table 5.3 – Country League Top 10/ 2006-2012 (1000TEU)
Country or
territory

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Growt
h Rate
(2012/2
006)

1

China

84,811

103,823

114,959

108,799

130,290

143,896

155,017

183%

2

USA

40,897

41,646

39,319

37,353

42,337

42,999

43,664

107%

3

Singapore

24,792

27,936

29,918

26,592

29,178

30,727

32,421

131%

4

China
(HKG)

23,539

23,998

24,494

21,040

23,699

24,384

23,100

98%

5

Korea

15,113

17,405

17,748

15,699

18,542

20,833

21,453

138%

6

Japan

18,470

19,028

18,944

16,285

18,098

19,417

21,232

115%

7

Malaysia

13,419

14,829

16,030

15,922

18,267

20,139

20,866

155%

8

Germany

15,010

16,644

17,178

13,296

14,821

17,218

17,579

117%

9

UAE

10,967

11,009

14,756

14,425

15,176

16,780

17,211

157%

1
0

China
(Taiwan)

13,102

13,720

12,971

11,352

12,736

13,473

13,977

107%

260,521

290,038

306,317

280,763

323,144

349,866

366,520

141%

60%

60%

60%

59%

60%

60%

61%

433,253

484,361

509,441

472,273

540,816

580,022

601,772

Sub. Total
Share of Top 10
World Total

Source: International association of ports and harbors (IAPH). (2013).
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139%

Figure 5.2 – Country League Top 10/ 2003-2012
Source: International association of ports and harbors (IAPH). (2013).

Statistics on bulk cargo show a similar trend that China is the country with the
largest portion of overall seaborne bulk trade in 2013, with a 13 percent share of the
total. China’s imports (a massive 1.8 billion tonnes) represented 23 percent of global
imports, including nearly 800mt of iron ore, 286mt of crude and products and 308mt
of coal (Clarkson Research, 2014). So, if China has to donate a large portion of the
fund, we could well ask the international community to establish the fund in China.
Secondly, as a national strategy, in 2009, the State Council issued Opinions on
Promoting the Development of Shanghai’s Modern Service Industry and Advanced
Manufacturing Industry, and Promoting the Construction of Shanghai International
financial Centre and International Maritime Centre (IMC). The opinions said the
goal is basically to build Shanghai into an IMC by 2020 with concentrated shipping
resources, maritime services, and efficient logistics service. The establishment of
China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone in September 2013 further opened up the
economic, shipping and trading market and provided more favorable conditions to
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promote the development of Shanghai as an IMC.

During the process of discussion of MBMs in IMO, we could negotiate with other
Member States more actively and creatively. For example, since China would have
contributed a large portion of money to the fund, plus the national strategy of
promoting shipping industry, we could provide IMO with very good resources and
conditions and try to attract the fund to be established in Shanghai. The nature of the
fund decides that the majority of the fund should be returned to the society to
mitigate the climate change, especially to help developing countries accumulate
knowledge and master technology to tackle GHG emissions from shipping sector. If
the fund is established in China, the biggest developing country in the world, it could
demonstrate the truly intention and determination of the international community to
help developing countries to achieve the goal. In addition, with the support from
China and more developing Members in IMO, I strongly believe that the MBMs
would be developed more smoothly and fast.
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Chapter 6 Conclusions

Transportation method for energy, materials, foods and products, maritime
transport is central to sustainable development. And the maritime transportation
system itself must, therefore, ensure that its development is also sustainable.
Energy-efficiency measures are, therefore, part of this concept, as they also
address the reduction of CO2 emissions from international shipping; a key factor
in ensuring international shipping contributes to efforts to mitigate climate
change.
(Sekimizu, 2014)

Corresponding to the deeper concerns over the environment than ever before by
public, IMO has been working very hard and adopted more regulations on the
environmental protection than other sectors recently. This dissertation attempts to
make an analysis of the MBMs to tackle GHG emissions. Due to the unavoidable
implementaion of MBMs and significant influence on the Chinese shipping industry,
several proposals are put forward to the authority.
It is recognized that the MBMs have more merits than the traditional regulatory
measures. It is cost effective. Through the MBMs, the allocation of the resources will
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be the most cost effective way as the MCCs for all ships would be adjusted to the
same level. The MBMs also promote the innovation and implementation of new
technologies. It rewards the more energy efficient ships and eliminates the old fleets
out of the market. It requires less administrative intervention and consequently save
administrative expenditure. Most importantly, it generates revenues, which could be
used into further research and development of new technologies.

The main problems associated with MBMs are also evaluated in this paper. What the
role is IMO going to play? How to design the MBMs to meet the both IMO and
UNFCCC’s principles? How to avoid the potential carbon leakage and market
distortion? These important questions also remind us that there are many unsolved
issues in the process of the establishment of MBMs. I believe that the core question
is the coordination of interests between developing and developed countries. We
need to think about the historical responsibilities of developed countries and
consider the requirement of the development of the developing world. Only by the
universal application of MBMs could the carbon leakage be prevented, and the
anticipated GHG emissions mitigation be achieved.

Whether from the perspective of the volume of seaborne trade transportation or the
controlled number of ships, China, undoubtedly, would be a big player and be
influenced by the MBMs significantly. The CO2 emissions under different scenarios
are calculated based on the international standards. It illustrated a very challenging
result indeed. Although it may take some time before the adoption of the MBMs, but
through the documents of the latest MEPC meeting, we could see that the consensus
generally have been achieved that a mandatory reporting of CO2 emissions and fuel
consumption of international shipping is necessary and in sore need. Therefore, as a
Council Member of category “A” in IMO, China needs to be prepared and contribute
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our best efforts to the development of MBMs.

Last but not least, IMO has made great efforts on the protection of environment. In
January 2013, the new chapter 4 to MARPOL Annex VI on Regulations on energy
efficiency for ships made the shipping industry to be the first international industrial
sector to be bounded by an international treaty law. The IMO GHG Study 2009
predicted that the amendments could improve ship energy efficiency considerably in
the coming decade. Figuring out the rising tide of new environmental rules and
regulations in shipping in the current situation may prove to be detrimental to the
industry, especially when the high fuel price has already push the ship operators to
improve energy efficiency and cut CO2 emissions, we should work even harder to
promote the full and effective implementation of the existing measures
internationally. China Maritime Authority has to be in the same line with other
central government agencies. We cannot ratify any treaty under IMO before any
sound conclusion in UNFCCC is reached.

International shipping is truly a complex industry, an international industry, a
multi-player industry. It is vital for all governments to understand that in the absence
of a global framework agreed by IMO, there is a serious risk of regional or unilateral
measures regulating CO2 emissions from shipping. This would bring a seriously
distorting effect on international shipping markets. Most importantly, without
coordinated efforts, it would be much less effective in delivering meaningful
reductions in CO2 emissions by global shipping sector as a whole.
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